

Thuo of Viborg and Marsilius of Inghen

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Summary: In qu. 15, book VII of his *Disputata Metaphysicae*, the Danish philosopher Thuo of Viborg (d. 1472) discusses singular, essential concepts. His view appears to be dependent on Marsilius of Inghen (ca. 1340-1396). Thuo investigates in various ways the nature of singularity and our knowledge of singulars. The function and ultimate goal of terms is to be used in propositions in accordance with the rules of the theory of supposition.

In the 1991 issue of *CIMAGL*, Andrea Tabarroni edited the *Disputata Metaphysicae* of Henricus Ruyn (= Heinrich Runen of Rostock), an Erfurt master from the 1430s-40s. That edition was intended to be preliminary to the one he will soon publish in the *Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi*, namely the *Disputata Metaphysicae* of Thuo Nicholai de Vibergia (= Tu[v]e Nielsen from Viborg, Jutland, Denmark), which is preserved in the same manuscript as Henry's work (Erfurt, WAB, CA Q. 436). Like Henry, Thuo, who died as archbishop of Lund in 1472, was a fellow of Collegium Porte Celi in Erfurt in the 1430s, and Dr Tabarroni has dated his course on the *Metaphysics* to the winter semester of 1438-9, while Henry may have given his course on an earlier occasion.

In his article from 1991 Dr Tabarroni noted that Henry's and Thuo's commentaries share structural features reflecting the teaching techniques practiced in Erfurt at the time, and also that Henry's work bears witness to the influence that Marsilius of Inghen's (ca. 1340-1396) *Questions on the Metaphysics* exerted at the university of Erfurt in the early fifteenth century. He later discovered that the same holds for Thuo's work. In this article I shall confirm his observation by analysing Thuo's fifteenth question on book VII and comparing it with the corresponding question in Marsilius' commentary. Both texts are printed in the appendix to this paper.

The problem dealt with in Thuo's question is whether there can be essential concepts of singulars, and in view of the length of the text he devoted to it one would think it held special interest for

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Thuo. Nevertheless, it will appear that Thuo was almost totally dependent on Marsilius. In general, Marsilius owed a great debt to John Buridan, and freely borrowed from the latter's questions, but in this particular case the Marsilian question, which has exactly the same topic and title as Thuo's, has no close match in Buridan's commentary, though it remains Buridanian in spirit.

In the fourteenth century there was a lively interest in concepts of individual substances and of individual accidents. Philosophers tried, more than in the preceding centuries, to develop a semantics of individual terms. From the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries we may discern at least two Parisian traditions. The first one – to which Buridan and Marsilius belong and which may be labeled 'nominalistic' – claimed that individual things are different one from another on their own account; generality only resides in concepts, which are more or less general ways of knowing individual substances and accidents. Among later philosophers in this tradition we may mention John Dorp (fl. 1400), and John Mair (1467/9-1550).

The rival tradition in Paris seems to have its origin in the early works of John Duns Scotus (1265-1308/9). It could be called an intentionalistic tradition, emphasizing concepts in the mind and holding that individual things differ one from another in virtue of some reality ('this-ness') added to their natures. George of Brussels (fl. 1495, d. 1510), Mauritius Hibernicus (commentary on Scotus' *Super Universalia Porphyrii*, 1504), and Peter Ta(r)taretus (ca. 1522) belong to this tradition.

In his *Disputata Metaphysicae* VII.15 Thuo of Viborg asks whether there are singular essential concepts,¹ and he explains that by an essential concept he means one that connotes nothing extrinsically. It later becomes clear that he means a concept that refers to (*supponit pro*) something without connoting anything extrinsic to the essence of that thing. It further becomes clear that he uses 'essence' for the concrete thing itself. This recalls twelfth-century usage (by Abelard, e.g.), but Thuo shows no more awareness of this fact than does Marsilius or Buridan.² Thuo does not define a singular concept, but he obviously takes it to be one that supposit

1 See Appendix I. Thuo's text will be edited in full by Dr. A. Tabbaroni in CPhD XIII.

2 King 1994: 423.

for just one thing, e.g. the concept of Socrates. So he implies that there are not only singular and general vocal terms, but also singular and general concepts, and accordingly, singular and general ways of signifying. This is all in line with the theories of Marsilius of Inghen and Buridan.³

The thesis (*conclusio*) that Thuo defends in his question is that there are singular essential concepts, and he supports this with three arguments before introducing objections and responses to those objections. In the first two arguments, Thuo claims that we actually have concepts of singulars that do not include their accidents, and that we could have a concept of some thing even if it had no accident at all. The third proof rests on the claim that individual terms of the category of substance are essential and not connotative.

Generally speaking, Thuo presents three types of arguments supporting his position on individuality: 1) arguments based on the cognition of individuals; 2) arguments based on the theory of the Aristotelian categories; 3) arguments based on imagined situations. In all three approaches the theory of supposition is of crucial importance. Thuo draws a distinction between the semantics of terms of the category of substance, that do not have connotation, and those of the accidental categories, that do have connotation. More elaborate forms of this view may be found in Marsilius of Inghen and John Buridan.⁴

Now, first the arguments based on cognition. Thuo's opponent says that individuals are distinguished by accidental properties, so that there cannot be a proper essential concept of an individual, because a singular term always refers to something other than the individual's essence. Thuo simply denies this: individuals are distinguished essentially, and since an essential concept only represents the essence of its thing, such a concept is possible.

The objection discussed by Thuo also occurs in Marsilius,⁵ and he characterizes it as the strongest argument of those who reject

3 Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, VII, 17. Marsilius says in his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* that grammatical functions, such as singular number and plural number, do not play a part in the distinction between singular and general terms.

4 See Appendix II for a provisional edition of qu. 17 of book VII of Marsilius' *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*.

5 See Appendix II, arg. 1.

singular essential concepts (*ratio fortior adversariorum*), later explaining that such people themselves attach particular importance to it. Marsilius had good reason to take it seriously inasmuch as his own views about how we cognize individuals shared some features with those on which the argument was based. In his Commentary on the *Sentences*, Marsilius says that the external senses represent an individual thing through representing its accidental properties – its individual colour, magnitude etc. Thus, for Marsilius, the senses furnish the background for such expressions as ‘hoc coloratum’ and ‘hoc magnum’, which refer to individual accidental properties and themselves belong to one of the accidental categories. While each of these pieces of sense-cognition is of accidents only, all pieces concerning one particular thing are “virtually” (i.e. structurally) one.⁶ But knowledge of an individual is not just the sum of the knowledge of its properties, the individual is known *modo singulari*,⁷ for as objects of its understanding the intellect has singular and determinate concepts (*conceptus singulares et determinati*), such as ‘Plato’ and ‘Socrates’. Thus Marsilius escapes the objection that individuals are only recognized by way of their different accidents. In his view, the subject as bearer of the accidents is indirectly understood. Here, as elsewhere, he advocates a dualistic semantics in which the meaning of a term consists of two kinds of significates.

In the *Metaphysics* question, in answer to the opponents’ “strongest argument”, Marsilius replies that human beings do indeed distinguish by means of accidents.⁸ This may cause trouble if somebody cognizes an egg and unbeknownst to him this is later exchanged with another egg. He may then mistake the new egg for the original one. But this does not imply that substantial terms have a connotation or that the deceived person had only one and

6 Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. Straßburg 1501, prologus, qu. 1, f. 10rb: “Que notitia quamvis diversis nominibus sic exprimitur, tamen est una incomplexa omnium horum expressorum virtualiter inclusiva, et ob hoc singularis est, quia rem sub suis proprietatibus individuantibus representat.” See also Bos 1987: 24-5.

7 Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones in De celo et mundo*, MS Cuyck en St. Agatha, Kruisherenklooster, C 12, book I, qu. 15, f. 139va: “Ad sextam: negatur consequentia. Ad probationem dicitur quod non est ex hoc, sed quia significat conceptu communi et terminus singularis modo singulari.”

8 See App. II, the text, arg. 1.

the same concept of the old egg and of the new one – it only means that he has been deceived by the accidents.

There is a similar discussion in Buridan.⁹ It is difficult to identify the opponents to whom Marsilius refers. Some philosopher of the fourteenth century? Perhaps even some twelfth-century thinker, such as Gilbert of Poitiers (1076-1154), about whom Garcia (1984: 175) says: “Gilbert does not say anything concerning the discernibility of individuals. He does say, however, that the numerical diversity of corporeal things is proven by the variety of their accidents and ultimately by their location.” This would not be the only place in which Marsilius discusses with a twelfth-century Platonist. Elsewhere he enters into debate with Richard of St Victor.¹⁰

The second type of argument relies on the theory of the categories. For Thuo, as for Marsilius and Buridan, the members of the categories are spoken or written terms and their corresponding concepts rather than extramental things grasped by the concepts.¹¹ In his third argument Thuo says that we are looking for a *conceptus singularis determinatus*, such as the concept of Socrates. This is a proper member of the category of substance rather than, e.g., ‘this man’ or ‘this ox’, which are *conceptus singulares vagi* only and, Thuo agrees with his opponent, they include a deictic element which is extrinsic to the category of substance. By parity of reasoning it would seem that one would have to reject the most promising candidates for the role of individual essential concepts in the accidental categories, viz. concepts like ‘this whiteness’ or ‘this white’ (*hoc album*). Thuo holds that we do have concepts of the essences of individual whitenesses etc., but they contain no deictic element. The demonstrative pronoun is just a device used in oral and written language for lack of proper names of accidents, so one should distinguish between the role of the pronoun in ‘this white’ and in ‘this body’. The two objections that claim that the pronoun of ‘this man’ and ‘this white’ implies an extrinsic connotation and so cannot be essential concepts are objections

⁹ King 1994: 415 refers to John Buridan, *Questiones in Metaphysicam* VII, qu. 17, ad 4 (f. 52rb).

¹⁰ See *Questiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. cit., f. 14va.

¹¹ Cf. John Buridan, *Summulae, Tractatus III* (ed. Bos), p. xxii, p. 21, ll. 11-15; p. 120 f.

that Thuo has taken over from Marsilius, but Marsilius does not provide the analysis of the deictic element that Thuo offers (though Thuo could find some inspiration in Marsilius' text).

Finally, Thuo argues his point by presenting imagined situations. Thuo takes this vantage point in his second proof of the initial thesis. He asks us to imagine that God create a substance without any accidents – something God could surely do. Such a substance would be intelligible, and this shows that there can be essential concepts of singulars. Once again, Thuo depends on Marsilius, who had forcefully put the point like this: “If nothing existed but God and Marsilius without any of his extrinsic common [properties], Marsilius would still be Marsilius!”.

Conclusion

In the Buridanian tradition, singularity is the basic characteristic of created things, substances and accidents alike. As for terms, they exist for the sake of appearing in propositions and function there according to the rules of supposition. This is the tradition to which Thuo belonged, and our analysis of his question on individual essential concepts has made it abundantly clear that Marsilius of Inghen was of the first importance in shaping his thought.

Appendix I

Thuo de Viberga, *Disputata Metaphysicae*¹²

Utrum sit aliquis conceptus singularis essentialis.

Conceptus essentialis est conceptus nihil connotans extrinsece.
 Conclusio. Aliquis est conceptus singularis essentialis.

Patet per experientiam, quia experimur in nobis quod habemus conceptum convenientem essentiae Socratis, seclusis omnibus accidentibus a Socrate.

Secundo probatur sic. Seclusis omnibus accidentibus rei singularis, essentia est intelligibilis sine accidentibus, et sic potest formari de illa conceptus singularis. Ut ponatur quod creatur aliqua

¹² Book VII, Q. 15, ed. Andrea Tabbaroni, forthcoming in CPhD.

substantia nullum habens accidens: est intelligibilis; et si sic, tunc res singularis potest habere conceptum singularem.

Tertio. Termini individuales praedicamenti substantiae sunt essentialis et non sunt connotativi extrinsece; ergo etc.

1. Arguitur. Non est ponendus conceptus singularis essentialis, ergo. Antecedens probatur, quia individua distinguuntur per accidentia, ergo conceptus individui erit repraesentativus accidentis. Consequentia tenet, quia conceptus repraesentat rem ut res se habet ad esse. Antecedens patet, quia non distinguimus Socratem a Platone nisi per accidentia.

1. Respondetur quod individua distinguuntur essentialiter et conceptus essentialis non est repraesentativus nisi essentiae rei.

2. Arguitur. Omnis conceptus essentialis Socrati est essentialis Platoni. Probatur, quia omnis conceptus est similitudo et quicquid est simile uni similitum est simile cuilibet similitum in eadem specie similitudinis; ergo quilibet conceptus absolute repraesentans Socratem etiam repraesentat Platonem.

2. Respondetur quod illud "quicquid est simile etc." est verum de similitudine repraesentationis reali, non autem quoad conceptum singularem.

3. Item arguitur. Si ponendus esset conceptus singularis, maxime esset conceptus aggregatus ex pronomine demonstrativo et termino substantiali, ut 'hic homo', 'hic bos' secundum Philosophum in *Praedicamentis*. Sed hoc non, quia ibi est demonstratio et illa est extrinseca praedicamenti substantiae; patet quia spectat ad relationem.

3. Respondetur quod per hoc complexum intelligitur conceptus vagus singularis, non autem singularis determinatus. Ad Philosophum dicitur quod ibi posuit exemplariter.

4. Item arguitur. Non potest esse conceptus essentialis huius albedinis, ergo nec ipsa substantia. Antecedens probatur, quia si esset aliquis, maxime correspondens huic complexo 'haec albedo'; sed hoc non, quia ibi est demonstratio, quae est extrinseca.

Sed si dicitur quod conceptus absolutus, si sic, tunc [est] conceptus iste erit repraesentativus cuiuslibet, et sic non est singularis.

4. Respondetur quod conceptus repraesentans essentiam huius albedinis sine actu demonstrativo, iste est essentialis, licet explicatur per actum demonstrativum. Hoc est propter defectum vocabuli, quia non habemus vocabulum impositum, quia 'hoc al-

bum' est terminus pronominalis, quia non habemus terminos in-complexos hoc significantes; ergo etc. Per hoc complexum 'hoc album' circumloquimur individuum terminorum accidentalium, sed <per> 'hoc corpus' non etc.

5. Item arguitur. Iste terminus 'Socrates' non est terminus singularis, ergo. Antecedens probatur, quia iste terminus 'Socrates' videtur connotare unionem materiae cum forma, ergo non est conceptus essentialis. Consequentia tenet, quia est passio entis, ut habetur IV et X huius. Antecedens probatur, quia materia et forma Socratis non sunt Socrates nisi unitae.

5. Respondetur quod conceptus Socratis non connotat unionem, sed absolute supponit pro composito ex materia et forma; et licet ibi requiritur unio, non tamen ut sic importat unionem. Patet, quia tunc esset terminus accidentalis, quod est falsum.

6. Item arguitur. Iste terminus 'Socrates' ultra materiam et formam aliquid connotat, quia materia et forma sunt perpetuae et Socrates non; ergo ultra materiam et formam aliquid connotat. Consequentia tenet, quia alias Socrates esset perpetuus, quia materia est perpetua.

6. Respondetur quod 'Socrates' supponit absolute pro materia et forma nihil connotando, licet per disiunctionem materiae a forma Socrates corrumpatur.

Appendix II

Marsilius de Inghen, *Questiones in Metaphysicam*, VII, qu. 17.¹³

Queritur decimo septimo utrum possit esse aliquis conceptus singularis essentialis, id est: utrum possit esse aliquid individuum vere in predicamento substantie.

Et arguitur quod non (1) quia nullus conceptus singularis est quin conveniat pluribus suppositis indifferenter, igitur nullus est singularis. Consequentia tenet quia: singularis conceptus non est plurium suppositorum distinctorum representativus.

¹³ Except where specified, the text is prepared from MS Vienna, *Österreichische Nationalbibliothek*, Vind. Pal. 5295, ff. 110va-112rb. According to Lohr 1971: 328, there are at least ten extant manuscripts containing this work.

Antecedens probatur dupliciter: Primo quia: non habemus viam distinguendi inter individua nisi per accidentia, ut notum est, et ergo si conceptus qui essentialiter representat Sortem, non solum erit Sortis, sed etiam representabit alium similiter dispositum cum Sorte [f. 110vb] in accidentalibus, igitur non convenit solum Sorti, sed alteri sibi simili.

Secundo probatur quia: quidquid est principalis similitudo unius similium, etiam est essentialis similitudo alterius similium in eadem specie similitudinis, ut si aliquid representat unum alborum prout est simile, etiam representat aliud album prout est simile. Modo, conceptus essentialis in aliqua specie est representativus unius similium quia representat rem istius speciei et omnes res in ista specie sunt similes, et per consequens representat aliud similium, et ergo nullus est conceptus singularis essentialis, quia iste non convenit pluribus. – Et ista est ratio fortior adversariorum.

(2) Secundo principaliter arguitur sic: si esset aliquis conceptus singularis essentialis, maxime esset conceptus essentialis ex pronomine demonstrativo et termino substantiali, ut dicendo ‘hic homo’, vel conceptus pronominis demonstrativi, <ut> dicendo ‘hoc’. Modo, nullus istorum est singularis essentialis, igitur etc. Maior patet quia: ‘iste homo’, ‘hoc animal’ etc. videntur esse individua de predicamento substantie, et presertim quia *ly* ‘hoc’ maxime demonstrat substantiam. Minor patet quia: ista individua portant secum demonstrationem et per consequens prospectum qui ulterius representat situm etc., et ergo sic connotarent extrinsecum, scilicet situm.

(3) Tertio sic: non potest esse conceptus singularis albedinis, igitur nec substantie. Consequentia tenet quia: albedinis est conceptus communis essentialis ita bene sicut substantie, et ideo¹⁴ non posset eius esse singularis conceptus sicut substantie. Antecedens patet quia: vel esset conceptus qui correspondet huic complexo ‘<hec> albedo’; et hoc non, per rationem precedentem; vel esset conceptus nudus albedinis, et hoc non, quia iste est representativus cuiuslibet albedinis.

(4) Quarto sic: conceptus cui apud animam correspondet iste terminus ‘Sortes’ non est singularis essentialis, igitur nullus est. Consequentia tenet quia: si aliquis esset, maxime esset iste.

¹⁴ quare MS.

Antecedens probatur multipliciter: (a) primo quia convenit successive diversis. Iam enim convenit Sorti habenti manum, et cras, si manus abscinditur, tunc significat aliquid quod remanet preter manum, de quo etiam nunc dicitur. Modo, istud non esset si esset essentialis, cum ut sic deberet dici de uno et eodem uno re, sicut alio, ut videtur.

[f. 111ra] Confirmatur (b) secundo: aliqua sunt nunc distincta, de quorum quolibet nunc diceretur iste terminus 'Sortes' univoce, igitur non est essentialis. Consequentia tenet quia: essentialis conceptus singularis sine nova impositione solum dicitur de una re.

Sed antecedens probatur: (b1) posito quod Sortes cum brachio vocetur A, et sine brachio B, tunc bene Sortes successive diceretur de A et B quia: absciso brachio¹⁵ adhuc verum est dicere quod residuum est Sortes, scilicet B, quod non esset nisi univoce diceretur de B. Modo, B et A realiter sunt distincta, quia unum non est aliud. Distinguuntur enim suppositionaliter, quia unum non est aliud, sicut totum et pars.

(b2) Secundo probatur antecedens nam: iste terminus 'Sortes' videtur connotare unionem materie cum forma, igitur non est essentialis. Consequentia tenet quia: ex quo unum unionem connotat, non est terminus essentialis, sed passio entis, quarto huius; et antecedens patet, nam materia et forma Sortis non dicerentur Sortes nisi essent unite¹⁶.

Confirmatur nam: si Sortes sit terminus essentialis purus, hec argumentatio valeret 'quicquid hec dualitas nunc est (demonstrando formam et materiam), hec ipsa semper erit; sed hec dualitas nunc est Sortes, igitur hec dualitas semper erit Sortes'. Conclusio est falsa quia post mortem Sortis, et maior patet, quia hec dualitas est perpetua. Vel formetur sic maior 'quidquid hec dualitas est, hoc semper erit quando erit', et sic non erit dubia. Sed minor ista est nota. Modo, vel oportet consequentiam non valere in *Datisi*, quod videtur inconueniens, vel quod consequentia non valet propter connotationem istius termini 'Sortes', quia scilicet propter unionem quam connotat et quod argumentum deficit propter fallaciam figure dictionis.

(5) Quinto: non potest esse terminus communis essentialis, igi-

15 absciso brachio (MS Krakow, Bibl. Jag. 709, f. 95va) absciso B brachio MS.

16 vite (?) MS.

tur nec singularis. Consequentia nota est, et antecedens probatur: primo quia quicumque terminus communis vel est singularis numeri, vel pluralis. Si singularis, tunc connotat singularitatem; si pluralis, tunc ipse connotat pluralitatem. Modo ista videntur esse extrinseca, et ex consequenti videtur sequi quod tales termini non sunt essentialia.

Confirmatur quia: si termini communes essent essentialia, maxime essent isti termini 'animal', 'homo' etc., ut patet in *Predicamentis*. Sed isti non sunt essentialia, quia connotant totalitatem, igitur etc. quia: non omnis substantia animata est homo, quia manus tua esset animal.

Item, non omnis substantia animata sensitiva est animal, quia alias capud equi esset animal; sed hoc non dicitur esse ex alio [f. 111rb] nisi quia isti termini connotant totalitatem.

Oppositum videtur velle Philosophus in isto septimo¹⁷ supponens in pluribus locis quod conceptus singulares¹⁸ sint et possint esse etiam essentialia, ut in tractatu tertio 'diffiniens'¹⁹ hunc solem etc.' ubi per 'hunc solem' intelligit terminum singularem sive conceptum singularem essentialem.

Item, in capitulo secundo septimi dicit quod substantia maxime videtur dici de quatuor, scilicet de quod quid erat esse, de universalis, de genere et de subiecto, et per 'subiectum' intelligit individuum predicamenti substantie, per Commentatorem,²⁰ quod maxime dicitur substantia, ut dicit Philosophus in littera.

Item, in *Predicamentis* manifeste habetur quod alique sunt prime substantie et alique secunde, et prime substantie dicuntur que maxime, primo et principaliter dicuntur, et dicuntur principaliter substare quia nichil extrinsecum connotant.

Item, si vis negare primam substantiam, tunc nulla erunt individua in predicamento substantie. Consequens negaret Aristotiles et negant communiter loyci.²¹ Et patet consequentia quia: termini connotativi extrinseci non sunt in predicamento substantie.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, ii, 1028 b 35.

¹⁸ essentialia MS.

¹⁹ diffiniens (MS Krakau, *Bibl. Jag.* 709, f. 95va)] diffinitiones MS.

²⁰ contarem (?) V. See Averroes, *In Metaphysicam* VII, comm. 2, f. 153 I.

²¹ E.g. Peter of Spain, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, p. 20; John Buridan, *Summulae, Tractatus III* (ed. Bos), p. 22, ll. 24-33.

In questione primo premittenda sunt notabilia, secundo respondendum est ad questionem.

Quantum ad primum est primo notandum quod terminus singularis dicitur terminus qui ex modo sue significationis sibi principaliter convenientis²² natus est supponere pro uno solo supposito, et vocat Porphyrius²³ terminum singularem individuum et etiam²⁴ Petrus Hispanus²⁵, et dicunt quod individuum est quod de uno solo predicatur et intelligit idem quod dictum est.

Secundo notandum quod terminus essentialis dicitur qui pro aliqua re supponit nichil extrinsece illi essentie²⁶ importando, nec etiam istam essentiam pluries super se reflectendo, quod dicitur propter terminos relativos aliquos ut est idem etc. Idem enim dicitur ens inquantum non est distinctum a seipso; connotat enim comparisonem eiusdem ad se, scilicet significando ens et connotando quod istius essentialis est sibi ipsimet causa et indistincta.

Tertio notandum quod *quidam* sunt dicentes quod rationes ante oppositum concludunt, presertim prima cum sua confirmatione, et ratio facta de isto termino 'Sor'. Et si isto modo debet dici, oportet istos negare totum modum predicamenti substantie, ymo, si ratio de Sorte concludit, tunc isti termini 'aer', 'aqua' etc. non essent termini substantiales, nam Deus potest separare formam substantialem aeris ab eius materia, et tunc potest argui de aere sicut de Sorte [f. 111va] sic: quicquid hec dualitas nunc est, cras erit; sed nunc est aer, igitur cras erit aer. Conclusio enim est falsa quia: cras forma aeris non tunc informat materiam aeris, et per consequens non erit tunc ista dualitas aeris. Apparet ergo quod iste terminus 'aer' etiam sit connotativus, ratione cuius consequentia non valet, cum premissae sunt vere. Et si sic, tunc sequeretur quod nullus alius conceptus sit essentialis, etiam communis, in predicamento substantie quia: compositorum eadem ratione non est sicut nec aeris. Item, simplicium non est conceptus essentialis maiori ratione quia talia non cognoscuntur nisi per discursum et comparisonem per sensum, de quibus magis deberet capi conceptus essentialis. Modo, omnia ista sunt inconvenientia et contra

²² solum *add.* MS.

²³ *Isagoge*, 7, 21-23.

²⁴ etiam (*Bibl. Jag.* 709, f. 95va)] apud MS.

²⁵ Peter of Spain, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, p. 19, l. 30.

²⁶ connotando *add. sed exp.* MS.

processum Philosophi in *Predicamentis*, et in isto septimo²⁷. Igitur etc.

Quarto notandum quod modi significandi gramaticales non dicuntur²⁸ esse connotata per terminos, nam licet secundum gramaticos 'petra' dicatur quasi 'pede trita' et ratione istius dicunt gramatici quod petra sit generis feminini, quia dicitur quasi passa, modo non oportet quod iste terminus 'petra' hec connotat, ut notum est, et sic patet de vocalibus vel scriptis. De mentalibus patet nam iste terminus 'homo' in mente significat te, non tamen connotat singularitatem super te, sed significat te tamquam suppositum eius, quia naturalis modus significandi eius est quod pro quolibet homine singulari natus est supponere tamquam pro suo supposito.

Quinto notandum quod intellectus noster est potentie talis abstractione quod prospecta re conceptu singulari vago potest abstrahere conceptum essentie istius rei communiter et simpliciter ab omnibus proprietatibus accidentalibus que possunt sibi convenire. Istud apparet quia: alias non posset in nobis produci iste conceptus quibus corresponde<n>t isti termini 'substantia', 'corpus', 'animal' etc., nam non videmus res per tales terminos significatas nisi per accidentia. Non enim percipimus substantiam sub ratione substantie, sed per accidentia.

Sed nunc venit questio quia: opinio adversariorum concedit quod conceptus essentialia communes sunt et etiam alii, utrum etiam possent esse singulares, quia hoc adversarii negant.

Hec de primo.

Quantum ad secundum est conclusio responsalis: quod potest esse conceptus singularis. Istud primo videtur patere per experientiam. Unus- [f. 111vb] -quisque enim experitur quod habet conceptum singularem Marsilii nichil dicentem sibi nisi essentiam Marsilii, et consequenter de qualibet re prospecta videtur sic esse.

Et confirmatur per *commune dictum* quia: dicit *Commentator* primo *Physicorum*²⁹ quod duplex est conceptus singularis, scilicet determinatus et conceptus singularis vagus. Et quid intelligit per 'conceptum singularem determinatum' nisi conceptum essen-

27 Aristotle, *Metaphysica* VII, iv, 1029 b 1-12.

28 *lectio incerta*.

29 Averroes, *In Physicam* I, 49, ed. Iuntina IV, f. 15r (*incertum*).

tialem? Quia si³⁰ accidentia connotat, igitur videtur dici vagus. Et hec conclusio videtur esse de mente *Philosophi*.

Secundo probatur ex effectu nam: si sic, conceptus cui correspondet iste terminus 'Marsilius', diceret extrinsecum accidens. Quod non videtur quia: quodcumque accidens dederit, adhuc iste terminus 'Marsilius' de pronomine demonstrante Marsilium diceretur secluso isto accidente, ymo, si solum esset Deus et Marsilius extrinsecis communibus Marsilio seclusis, adhuc Marsilius esset Marsilius.

Tertio probatur per rationem³¹ nam: per abstractionem intellectus potest a convenientia communi sive generali sive speciali trahere conceptum generalem sibi specialem. Quare non potest a convenientia individuali trahere conceptum essentialem et singularem? Modo primum potest, igitur et secundum. Consequentia nota est, et maior patet quia: non videtur causa diversitatis sive ratio; et minor patet per omnes, sive secundum opinionem dicentem quod non possit esse conceptus singularis essentialis, sive secundum aliam dicentem oppositum.

Hec de secundo articulo.

Ad rationes.

(Ad 1) Ad primam: negatur antecedens. Ad probationem: conceditur quod distinguimus inter res per accidentia. Et negatur consequentia. Sed conceditur quod, qui haberet conceptum essentialem Sortis videns alium sibi similem in accidentalibus, crederet se videre Sortem et decipere<tur>, eo quod conceptus iste derivatus est ab abstractione accidentium talium que sunt similia accidentibus Sortis a quibus abstrahit conceptum essentialem Sortis representativum; ut si esset ovum ante me, et ego verterem me, et tu poneres aliud ovum, et ego viderem³², secundum crederem primum; non tamen conceptum³³ quem haberem de primo ovo, essentialem, habeo de secundo ovo, sed quia credo secundum ovum esse primum, hoc est: quia deciperem in accidentibus.

Item, eodem modo [f. 112ra] sequeretur quod termini communes de predicamento substantie essent connotativi quia: si ter-

³⁰ scilicet MS.

³¹ per rationem *add.* MS.

³² videres MS.

³³ conceptus MS.

ram videres sub speciebus aque, crederes terram esse aquam, non tamen iste terminus 'aqua' propter hoc connotat, ut adversariimet dicunt.

Ad secundam probationem: negatur maior nam: conceptus singularis qui est in me representans Sortem, nullo modo postea representat Platonem si obiceretur michi Plato, etsi Sortes et Plato essent similes in accidentibus³⁴, quia tunc non essent singulares. Verum est tamen quod sensus deciperetur quia crederet quod conceptus iste representaret sibi Platonem, sed non representat quia conceptus dixit primo hoc prospectum, quod fuit Sortes, et iam non diceret istud prospectum, sed aliud, scilicet Platonem. Posset tamen maior concedi de similibus communibus, sed tunc non esset ad propositum maioris, nec contra propositum.

(Ad 2) Ad secundam: negatur quod maxime essent isti termini 'hoc animal', 'iste homo' etc. Ad probationem dicitur quod *Philosophus* in *Predicamentis* ponit ista complexa loco individuorum et terminorum singularium. Pronomina enim demonstrativa important demonstrationem et rem prospectam connotative, licet significant substantiam.

(Ad 3) Ad tertiam potest negari antecedens, et dicitur quod albedinis potest esse conceptus essentialis singularis. Et ad probationem dicitur quod iste conceptus representat non denominative, nec conceptu communi, sed representat hanc essentiam huius albedinis singulariter et absolute. Potest tamen admittendo antecedens negari consequentia. Ad probationem dicitur quod non valet consequentia 'substantiarum possunt esse conceptus singulares absoluti, igitur et accidentium', quia accidens non habet rationem essentialem per se stantis sicut substantia, et ergo intellectus naturaliter format conceptum singularem essentialem eam representantem, sed albedinem intellectus representat ut inheret. Utrum autem albedinis posset esse conceptus singularis absolutus vel non, non discutitur in presenti. Probabiliter tamen potest dici, iuxta prius dicta, quod sic.

(Ad 4) Ad quartam negatur antecedens. Ad probationem (a) dicitur quod idem sunt et unum Sortes cum manu et Sortes sine manu, quia manu deposita a Sorte adhuc manet Sortes, quia iste terminus 'Sortes' non connotat habere manum vel pedem.

34 accidentalibus MS.

Ad secundam partem,³⁵ scilicet confirmationem, (b) dicitur quod ista ratio petit unam communem dubitationem, nam sicut arguitur de conceptu singulari determinato, ita posset argui de quolibet vago determinato [f. 112rb] universaliter. Et ergo dixi quod non est inconueniens terminum singularem de duobus suppositis non omnimode eisdem successive verificari quorum unum erat aliud, etiam quorum unum nunc est pars, et aliud totum. Modo, A erit B in casu confirmationis (b1) ergo³⁶ tunc iste terminus 'Sortes' successive diceretur de duabus suppositis. Dicitur quod supponat pro eis successive, sed tamquam pro uno, quia unum erat aliud.

Ad tertiam (b2) negatur quod iste terminus 'Sortes' connotat unionem, sed supponit simpliciter pro isto *hoc aliquid* composito ex materia et forma. Ad probationem: conceditur quod materia et forma non sunt Sortes nisi unite. Verum est <quod> nec ens nec unum sunt sine unione, non tamen unionem connotant. Ad probationem: negatur maior, nam ista dualitas essentialiter nunc est Sortes et post corruptionem Sortis mutatur ista dualitas, et tamen non est nec erit tunc Sortes. Si diceres probando maiorem 'quidquid ista dualitas est, hoc est per suam essentiam', verum est. Sed consequentia non valet: 'cum nunc sit Sortes quod semper erit Sortes' quia: licet essentia est hoc quod est, tamen successive ista dualitas aliter et aliter potest se habere et habebit Sorte mortuo. Eadem enim ratione, si solutio³⁷ non valeret, probaretur quod iste terminus 'celum' vel 'aer' non sit substantialis. Potest tamen concedi 'quidquid ista res nunc est vel ista dualitas, semper erit vel aliqua que fuerit ipsum'.

(Ad 5) Ad quintam negatur antecedens. Ad probationem conceditur quod termini communes sint singularis numeri vel plurali<s>. Et negatur quod ista connotant, licet habeant modum significandi talem gramaticalem, sed singularis pro quolibet suo uno supposito natus est supponere, pluralis numero pro pluribus suppositis pro quibus³⁸ quilibet terminus singularis natus est supponere.

35 patet MS.

36 *incerta lectio.*

37 solutio MS Krakau, *Bibl. Jag.* 709, f. 95va] soluta MS.

38 quibus MS Krakau, *Bibl. Jag.* 709, f. 96ra] quolibet MS.

Ad confirmationem: conceditur maior, et negatur minor. Ad probationem istius conceditur quod quelibet pars hominis sit homo saltem integralis prout ly 'homo' significat absolute sine totalitatis connotatione.

Rationes post oppositum sunt pro dictis.

Hec de questione.

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